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 ABSTRACT 
 
The subject of optimal pricing is consistently on the forefront of debate among 
firms in all market situations.  Optimal pricing is further complicated when there are 
common resource inputs associated with the production of a multitude of different 
products.  Economic theory has suggestions for pricing optimally in a variety of market 
conditions, from perfect competition, to perfect monopoly.  This paper presents an 
experiment where a firm is attempting to optimally price multiple products with common 
cost inputs subject to monopolistic market conditions.  The result supports the hypothesis 
of substitution amongst the product line relative to prices, as well as presents some 
evidence of optimal prices for both products. 
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 INTRODUCTION 
 
 Firms who are ‘for-profit’ are constantly on the quest for profit maximization, 
and the firm will be profitable if it can efficiently produce and optimize product price 
according to market conditions.  There is a multitude of economic literature on how firms 
of all types optimize prices in different market conditions in order to maximize profits.  
The purpose of this paper is to present an optimal price experiment conducted by a firm 
with two substitutable products, subject to monopolistic market conditions and some 
common input costs.  
Of the many economics textbooks that I have consulted, they all agree that 
monopolies maximize profits where their marginal cost equals their marginal revenue.1 
Furthermore, it is unanimously agreed that firms who can price discriminate, i.e. segment 
their prices to separate their markets, will realize greater profits than those who can’t.2 
 In his book entitled The Strategy & Tactics of Pricing (1987), Nagle explains that 
“an appropriate pricing strategy depends on costs, price sensitivity, and competition.”3  
Customers who are relatively insensitive to price, more costly to serve, or less well 
served by competitors can be charged a higher price without losing customers whom the 
firm can serve more profitably at a lower price. From Nagle, you can infer that in markets 
were there is little competition; firms are more able to segment prices.  Further, if the 
                                                 
1 This includes, but is not limited to, all the texts quoted and mentioned within this document. 
2 Some firms won’t try to segment prices because there are many legal implications against doing so.  
Creative firms often by-pass those legalities by offering coupons and other segmentation implements; those 
who can segment pricing become more profitable. 
3 Quote from the second paragraph on page 156 of The Strategy & Tactics of Pricing (1987) by Thomas T. 
Nagle. 
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 firm produces substitutable products in those less competitive markets, it is essentially 
segmenting buyers by the prices of the two products, and therefore can capture more 
profits4.  I will further explore these ideas later in this paper 
In this experiment, I assume that the firm’s average consumer has a relatively 
inelastic demand for the products5, and therefore I predict the optimal price combination 
of the two products, where profits are maximized, will be when they are both at their 
highest price level6.  Furthermore, I hypothesize that there is substitution effect between 
the two products the firm produces.7  The goal of this paper is to investigate a self-
generated data set regarding sales of a two product firm in order to make inferences on 
how to price its two products subject to the current market conditions. 
In the following paper, I will summarize some of the main findings in relevant 
literature on monopoly price optimization and joint product price optimization.  Then, I 
will discuss the economic principles related to the experiment conducted, as well as the 
two product models, and the conducted experiment itself.  Following the theory and 
experiment discussion, I will present and describe the data collected using graphs and 
tables, and then analyze it using regression analysis as well as a simple cost/profit 
analysis.  Finally, I will discuss the results from each analysis and make concluding 
remarks, which will include a recommendation to the owner of the firm as how to price 
each product. 
                                                 
4 Summarized from the Summary section of The Strategy & Tactics of Pricing (1987) by Thomas T. Nagle. 
5 The discussion of the firm’s average consumer, and why I believe his demand to be inelastic, can be 
found in the following THEORY section of this document. 
6 Meaning when the price for each product is the highest it will be in the duration of my experiment; i.e. 
during the week 8/2-8/8 per the price variation matrix found in Table 1 on page 25. 
7 Meaning that when the price of one product increases, the average consumer will substitute away from it, 
and towards the other product; and vice versa. 
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 LITERATURE REVIEW 
Discussions of relevant literature pertaining to the scope of this paper 
 
 Most of the relevant literature pertaining to topics in this paper is found in current 
textbooks and academic publications, some of which are quoted and cited throughout the 
document.  I have yet to find any literature with a similar experiment or similar scope in 
the simple way I have presented it; although I found one relevant journal article that I will 
describe in the next few paragraphs. 
 This article comes from the Journal of Marketing and is entitled Pricing the 
Product Line during Periods of Scarcity; by Kent B. Monroe and Andris A. Zoltners.8  
Monroe and Zoltners present The Decision Problem and a theoretical solution.  Basically, 
they state generally, that the firm has several product lines, many of which contain 
products that are closely related.  This is because (1) the demands for the products are 
interrelated, (2) their costs of production and distribution are interrelated, (3) both costs 
and demands are interrelated, or (4) the production of multiple products enables the firm 
to appeal to several different market segments.9  The Decision Problem arises when the 
firm is trying to decide how to price its multiple product lines subject to the previously 
presented conditions of interrelatedness; in order to maximize profits. 
 Monroe and Zoltners present that the theoretical optimal solution is for the firm to 
equate marginal revenue with the adjusted marginal cost for each product; which depends 
                                                 
8 From the Journal of Marketing, Vol. 43, No. 3. (Summer, 1979), pp 49-59. 
9 Summarized from the Conceptual Framework section of Pricing the Product Line During Periods of 
Scarcity (1979) by Kent B. Monroe and Andris A. Zoltners. 
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 on the impact of a product’s price and volume changes on the revenues and costs of the 
other products in the same product line.  This is further complicated in many ways, but 
the authors say it is mainly because of the inability to obtain reasonable estimates of 
product line demand interrelationships, as well as the multiproduct firm typically using 
joint or common resources to produce various products. 
 A solution for the demand interrelationship problem is approached as a 
complicated forecasting analysis, but its accuracy is questionable. A solution to the 
common resource problem is presented, and seems as feasible as any.  Monroe and 
Zoltners present a “Product-Line Contribution Analysis” that they think helps alleviate 
the problem of common resources.  Basically, the algorithm calculates the amount each 
product in the line contributes to cover fixed expenses, using two common resources; 
labor and materials.  Multiplying by units produced during the period, they calculate total 
contribution of each product in the product line, and base their product decision upon 
profits generated at the current prices of those products. 
 In summary, Monroe and Zoltners demonstrate the inadequacy of the gross 
margin approach for product-mix and pricing decisions when a firm is operating at 
capacity.  They present a superior CPRU criterion10 using mathematical programming 
with abundant theoretical justifications.   
While this paper is theoretical, rather than empirically experimental, it presents 
some interesting ideas on how a firm with multiple products should choose its price and 
                                                 
10 The exact definition(s) of this CPRU criterion is not necessary for the scope of this paper.  I sum it up to 
say that it is a rating scale which is assigned through a computer analysis of the costs and benefits of 
different levels of production of a firm’s multiple products; then rates each according to its contribution in 
the product line in order to determine the optimal mix. 
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 quantity.  Some of which could be used to further investigate the data collected for this 
paper’s experiment. 
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 THEORY 
General discussions of economic principles and models, as well as the economics 
relating to this paper and experiment 
 
The Law of Demand and Price Elasticity 
 
In Economics, the law of demand says that when all other things are held constant; 
the price of a product has an inverse relationship with its quantity demanded by the 
market.  In simpler terms, when the price of a product increases, consumers demand a 
smaller quantity, and when the price of a product falls, consumers demand a larger 
quantity.  This is no different for any type of good or service, as long as the firm faces a 
downward sloping demand curve.  We have yet to find a good or service in which a 
higher quantity is demanded as the price is increased11, therefore we observe that all 
firms face a downward sloping demand curve.  Furthermore, we observe that this is true 
for all firms, whether they are in monopolistic or competitive markets.12 
The extent that consumers demand more, or a less, of a product when the price 
changes, is called the consumer’s Price Elasticity of Demand.  Further defined as the 
measurement of how sensitive the change in quantity demanded is to the change is price, 
                                                 
11 A product that exhibits this sort of relationship is called a “giffen good”.  Some might argue that 
addictive substances, such as heroin, or some luxury goods exhibit this sort of relationship; although to my 
knowledge, no good has ever been proven giffen. 
12 Paragraph summarized from section 6.4 on page 104 of Intermediate Microeconomics (2003) by Hal R. 
Varian. 
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 in percentage terms.13   We can calculate the price elasticity of demand in the same way 
as described in the above definition using the formula14 on the following page: 
 
 
Ed  =  price elasticity of demand coefficient = % change in quantity demanded 
                  % change in price 
 
 
Or, numerically: 
 
 
Ed  =  (ΔQ/Q) ÷ (ΔP/P) 
 
We use the price elasticity of demand coefficient, Ed, to measure a consumer’s 
responsiveness to percent changes in price for a given good or service.  If buyers are 
relatively responsive to price changes, the percent change in quantity demanded is greater 
than the percent change in price, then the buyer’s demand is said to be Elastic and Ed > 1.  
If buyers are relatively unresponsive to percent changes in price, the percent change in 
quantity demanded is less than the percent change in price, the buyer’s demand is said to 
be Inelastic and Ed < 1. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
13 Definition summarized from the first paragraph on page 80 of Managerial Economics (2006) by Paul G. 
Keat and Philip K. Y. Young. 
14 Price elasticity of demand coefficient equations borrowed from pages 116-117 of Microeconomics:  
Private Markets and Public Choice (2000) by Robert B. Ekelund, Jr. and Robert D. Tollison. 
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 Profit Maximization and Competitive Markets 
 
The profit maximization hypothesis is generally accepted within the economic 
theory of the firm.  In economics, we assume that the principle objective of any firm is to 
maximize its profits, i.e. to “make money”, or at the very least, minimize its losses.15 
A competitive firm’s profits, represented by π, are  
π = pq – C(q), 
where p is the price, q is the firm’s output, and C(q) is total cost to the firm.16  
Generally, we think of firms in competitive markets as price takers, meaning they 
accept the price in the market, and supply the appropriate quantity demanded.  In 
competitive markets, prices are “equal to the costs of production plus a normal profit17 
for sellers.”18  Accepting that firms are for-profit entities who are inclined to follow the 
profit maximization hypothesis it is profitable for firms to produce as long as the extra 
revenue from the sale of an additional unit exceeds the extra cost of producing it.  The 
extra revenue from selling one more unit is p, or the price the firm receives.  The extra 
cost of producing one more unit is called marginal cost.  Consequently, profit-
maximizing firms in competitive markets produce where the price from the market equals 
their marginal cost. 
                                                 
15 Profit Maximization Hypothesis summarized from page 32 of Managerial Economics (2006) by Paul G. 
Keat and Philip K. Y. Young. 
16 Equation and discussed summarized from pg 58 of Modern Industrial Organization (2005) by Dennis W. 
Carlton and Jeffrey M. Perloff; where pq (price times quantity) is total revenue and C(q) is total costs at q 
level of output production. 
17 Normal Profits are costs that are “essential to obtain and keep the owners’ resources in the business”; 
found on page 43 of Managerial Economics by Paul G. Keat and Philip K. Y. Young. 
18 Found in the definition of Competition on page 87 of Microeconomics:  Private Markets and Public 
Choice (2000) by Robert B. Ekelund, Jr. and Robert D. Tollison. 
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 It is easy to understand how firms that can lower marginal costs should, and most 
certainly will do so in order to maximize their profit potential in a competitive market.  It 
is also easy to validate the profit maximization hypothesis put forth in the theory of the 
firm. 
 
A Note on Monopoly 
 
In monopoly there is but only one firm in the industry; “Here, industry and firm 
demand curves are on and the same.” 19  Firms are monopolies when they are the only 
supplier of a good or service in which there is no close substitute.  In industries where 
firms have monopoly power, the firm/industry faces a downward sloping demand curve; 
i.e. the market demand curve.  Buyers purchasing goods or services from monopolies 
have a more inelastic demand because of the lack of substitutes in the market.  This 
enables the monopoly to charge a higher price than firms in competitive markets, and 
therefore the economic architecture designing their quest for profits is different.  
 
Monopoly Profit Maximization 
 
In order to maximize profits, monopolistic firms may either choose their level of 
output or set their price in the market.   More completely, the monopolist either sets the 
price of his product, and accepts the quantity demanded by the market demand curve, or 
                                                 
19 Quote from the last paragraph on page 137 of Managerial Economics and Organizational Architecture 
(2001) by James A. Brickley, Clifford W. Smith, Jr. and Jerold L. Zimmerman. 
     9 
 produces a certain quantity, and accepts the price that the monopoly’s market demand 
curve dictates.  The more effective the monopolist is at estimating the market demand for 
his product, the greater profits he can obtain by setting his price or quantity appropriately.  
Carlton and Perloff state “a monopoly maximizes its profits when the extra revenue from 
selling one more unit just equals the extra cost of producing that last unit of output.” 20   
This means that monopolies can maximize profits when their marginal revenue equals 
their marginal cost.  For the graphical explanation, see the following graph in Figure 1 
and the accompanying discussion.  
 
As you can see in the graph, the monopolist produces where the marginal revenue 
curve crosses the marginal cost curve. He produces the market demanded quantity of Qm 
at price Pm, and receives the rents in the square labeled “Monopoly Profit”.  The graph 
Figure 1 
Figure 1 
                                                 
20 Quote from the last paragraph on page 90 of Modern Industrial Organization (2005) by Dennis W. 
Carlton and Jeffrey M. Perloff. 
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 also illustrates the deadweight loss associated with the monopoly producing the good, 
rather than competitive firms.  You can see where competitive firms would produce, at 
Qc and receive the price of Pc.  Monopoly profits are greater because the quantity 
produced (Qm) is less than quantity demanded in competitive equilibrium (Qc), but the 
monopoly receives the higher price (Pm) because they constrain quantity in the market.21 
 
Price Discrimination 
 
In an attempt to capture profits, firms may charge non-uniform prices to try to sell 
to more intense demanders (more inelastic) at higher prices, and less intense (more elastic) 
demanders at lower prices.  For the following discussion consider additions made to the 
previous graph of the profit-maximizing monopoly.  If the monopoly sold at current price 
Pm, it would sell Qm number goods and make profits represented by the Monopoly 
Profits section of the above graph.  There are still rents available at prices above, and 
below Pm, yet they are not captured because of where the current price is, Pm.  If the 
monopoly could identify the intensity of demand of each consumer, that is, their price 
elasticity of demand coefficient, and charge a relative different price to each, some of 
these lost rents could be captured.  Let us speculate as to what could happen if the 
monopolist could somehow differentiate its consumers into three groups based on their 
demand, and sell to them at their valued price.  There would be those who buy at the 
                                                 
21 The above graph, and its following discussion was recreated and summarized from pages 90, 91, and 92 
of Modern Industrial Organization (2005) by Dennis W. Carlton and Jeffrey M. Perloff. 
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 monopoly price, those who buy at a higher-than-monopoly price, the more intense 
(inelastic) demanders, and those who buy at a less-than-monopoly price, the less intense 
(elastic) demanders.  See the following Figure 2 and accompanying discussion. 
 
As you can see, if the monopolist can separate the market based on individual’s 
willingness to buy, he can greatly increase his profits.22  He not only gets his original 
monopoly price profits of Qm x Pm, but also the less intense demanders profits of Qli x 
Pli as well as the more intense demanders profits of Qmi x Pmi.  We can think about how 
additional profits could be gained from discriminating even further, to price in between 
the three levels speculated above. 
Figure 2 
Figure 2 
Barring current legal implications against such practices, firms may practice price 
discrimination, and it seems monopolies have the biggest advantage in doing so.  So how 
                                                 
22 Note: the graph does not show the demand curves for the three different consumers, but only the 
market/industry demand curve, subject to Pm from the previous graph.  This is to simplistically portray the 
positive effect that price discriminating could have on the monopoly’s original profits. 
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 can price discrimination work in the real world market and what conditions must a firm 
meet in order to effectively price discriminate? 
In Modern Industrial Organization, Carlton and Perloff describe three conditions 
for price discrimination, summarized here: 
1. The firm must have some market power 
2. The firm must have some information in order to estimate a consumer’s 
willingness to pay per unit. 
3. The firm must be able to prevent or limit resales.23 
These three basic conditions must be met for a firm to effectively price 
discriminate.  Of course, in the case of monopoly, the first is easily met, which is why 
monopolies are in the best position for price discriminating.  Of course, firms do not have 
to be monopolies to price discriminate, but they must hold enough of the market so that 
consumers are deterred from searching for the same product from other firms. 
The second condition is harder to accomplish.  Firms, who can more effectively 
identify whom to charge the higher prices, will make more sales and more profits.  There 
are many ways this can be attempted.  By researching the market, firms may gain 
knowledge about current and prospective buyers to aid in their price discriminating 
tactics. Some firms might offer quantity-dependent prices, so that when consumers buy 
higher quantities, they pay less per good.  This enables the firm to charge a higher price 
for just one good, as well as assess the demand for different quantities of the good at 
                                                 
23 Three conditions for price discrimination and the following discussion are summarized from pages 294-
295 of Modern Industrial Organization (2005) by Dennis W. Carlton and Jeffrey M. Perloff 
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 lower prices.  However they do it, firms must be able to assess each consumer’s 
willingness to pay in order to price discriminate. 
Lastly, firms must be able to limit resales.  It is easy to see how consumers might 
want to resell the firm’s product if they bought it at a low price, and observe other buyers 
purchasing at a high price.  To effectively price discriminate, firms must be able to stop 
the entrepreneurial buyer from reselling their product to more intense demanders in the 
market.  Firms who offer services rarely have the problem of resales, as most services 
cannot be resold or traded.  For example, you cannot resell the dental check-up you had 
last month. 
When firms sell tangible goods, they must extend efforts to limit resales in order 
to price discriminate. Governmental regulations can aid firms by establishing laws that 
limit or prevent resales.  Firms might also attempt to limit resales by offering warranties 
that are void if the product is resold.  Additionally, firms might contractually forbid its 
buyers from reselling its product.  However they do it, to reap the profits from price 
discrimination, firms must limit resales of its product in the market.  
 
Costs 
 
When a firm is operating at full efficiency, it can produce output at the lowest 
possible cost.  For profit maximization, it is in the best interest of the firm to seek the 
most efficient operation possible so that the costs it incurs in producing are at the lowest 
level possible. 
     14 
 The first type of costs that a managerial economist must define and attempt to 
measure is opportunity cost.  “The opportunity cost of using a resource for a given 
purpose is its value in its best alternative use.”24  For example, the opportunity cost of 
spending four hours of the afternoon playing golf is the value of those four hours in their 
next best alternative use, like working.  It is important for managers to think of 
opportunity cost in current market prices.  If the firm bought some input a year ago, 
inventoried it, and is value has appreciated, the firm might want to sell it at the market 
price, rather then use it in production.  Opportunity costs must be evaluated in this way so 
that managers and firms make rational business decisions. 
Firms also incur costs that vary with output, as well as costs that do not.  Costs 
that vary with the level of output are referred to as variable costs or VC.25  Examples of 
variable costs are labor and production materials. Costs that do not vary with the level 
output are referred to as fixed costs or FC.  Examples of fixed costs are monthly rent for 
production equipment or fees paid to the government for business licensing.  A firm’s 
total costs, TC, are the sum of its fixed costs and its variable costs:  TC = FC + VC.  As 
previously discussed, there are also marginal costs, MC, which is the production cost of 
an additional unit.  “Because fixed costs does not change as output increases, the 
increase in total cost when output increases is identical to the corresponding increase in 
                                                 
24 Quote from the first paragraph on page 17 of Managerial Economics and Organizational Architecture 
(2001) by James A. Brickley, Clifford W. Smith, Jr. and Jerold L. Zimmerman 
25 Discussion of types of costs and cost concepts summarized from pages 29-30 of Modern Industrial 
Organization (2005) by Dennis W. Carlton and Jeffrey M. Perloff 
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 variable cost.”26  Marginal cost can be thought of as the rate of change in total variable 
cost27, and can be expressed in symbols in the following Eq1. 
Eq1.      MC  =  Δ TVC  /  Δ Q 
Firms also think about costs in terms of average costs, of which there are three 
common types: 
Eq2.  shows Average Variable Cost (AVC) which is total variable cost at quantity q, 
divided by output.      
Eq2.      AVC = TVC(q)/Q 
Eq3. Shows the formula for Average Fixed Costs (AFC) as the total fixed costs at 
quantity q, divided by output28. 
Eq3.     AFC = TFC(q)/Q 
Average Total Cost (ATC) is the total cost at quantity q, divided by output, seen in Eq4.  
Eq4.     ATC = TC(q)/Q = AFC + AVC 
  
Cost Concepts and Multiproduct Firms 
 
 It is common for most firms to produce multiple products and a firm that does so 
is referred to as a multiproduct firm.  Firms frequently produce multiple products because 
there are economies of scope, of which “exist when the cost of jointly producing a set of 
                                                 
26 Quote from the first paragraph on pg 30 of Modern Industrial Organization (2005) by Dennis W. Carlton 
and Jeffrey M. Perloff 
27 Equation and definition summarized from pages 239 and 240 of Managerial Economics by Paul G. Keat 
and Philip K. Y. Young 
28 Definitions of average costs from the second paragraph on page 30 of Modern Industrial Organization 
(2005) by Dennis W. Carlton and Jeffrey M. Perloff 
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 products within one firm is less than the cost of producing the products separately across 
independent firms.”29  For many firms, it is more efficient to utilize their fixed cost 
resources, like for instance, a production plant, to produce multiple products.  This is 
because, like the production plant, most fixed cost inputs are very expensive and it is 
cheaper to use them in multi-product production than say building two different plants to 
produce two products. 
Multiproduct firms cannot measure average cost or marginal cost as previously 
defined because there are multiple measures of output.  You can however attempt to 
define and measure costs using concepts that are analogous to the single product firms 
discussed in the previous section. 
 Consider a firm with two products, 1 and 2, where q1 of product 1 and q2 of 
product 2 are produced.  The firm can calculate marginal cost of producing product 1 by 
increasing q1 to q1 + 1, holding output of product 2 constant, at q2.  The same can be done 
for marginal cost of q2, using the same equation and holding q1 constant. 30 
 Defining and calculating average cost, particularly average total cost, is not easily 
accomplished in a multiproduct firm because they frequently incur common costs.   
Common costs are defined as costs of inputs that are used in the production of all the 
firm’s products and arise because of economies of scope.  Consider the following 
example of a candy shop:   
                                                 
29 Ideas and quotes from pages 118, 119, and 123 of Managerial Economics and Organizational 
Architecture (2001) by James A. Brickley, Clifford W. Smith, Jr. and Jerold L. Zimmerman 
30 Ideas and equations were summarized from the first paragraph on page 44 of Modern Industrial 
Organization (2005) by Dennis W. Carlton and Jeffrey M. Perloff 
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 All candy is made from sugar, and different candies require different colorings, 
different flavorings, and different amounts of sugar in order to make a different 
product. In order to make candy, specific amounts of the colorings, flavorings, 
and sugar are blended in a mixer.  Different kinds of candies take require 
different kinds of mixing and for certain lengths of time.  In this example, the 
mixer is a common cost because it is used in the production of all the different 
candies. 
 
 From the candy shop example, you may see that it is hard for us to calculate 
average costs in multiproduct firms.   This is because common cost inputs, like the mixer, 
are used in production of different quantities of all the types of candies, and it is almost 
impossible to appropriate the certain periods of time and types of mixing to each of the 
different candies.   
More simply put, economists cannot effectively calculate average costs in 
multiproduct firms without a proper way to allocate common costs because common 
costs are included in fixed costs, which are used across the production of various outputs. 
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 Multi-Product Empirical Models with Substitutable Products 
 
 As I’ve discussed, multiproduct firms, whether in monopolistic or competitive 
markets, are subject to a downward sloping demand curve31.  In the simplest case, we 
assume a linear market demand curve for any product, as well as constant costs for each 
product.32  The model is further complicated when the different products the firm 
produces are substitutable.  Consider the following example of a bread company for a 
simple explanation: 
A bread company can be thought of as a multiproduct firm that produces 
substitutable products.  Most (if not all) bread companies produce a wide range 
of different types of breads.  For instance, in the super market you can find 
multiple loaves of sliced bread produced by the company Sarah Lee.  Sarah Lee 
produces similar-sized loaves of white bread, wheat bread, and whole grain 
bread; and the average consumer wants a single loaf of bread for each week to 
make toast and sandwiches.33  Of course, you can make toast and sandwiches 
with all three of the previously mentioned types of bread, but the consumer most 
likely prefers one type over the others.  Now, he must substitute one type of bread 
for the other due to his personal tastes, as well as his budget. 
                                                 
31 It must be said, theoretically, in perfect competition the individual supplier does not confront a downward 
sloping demand curve; he confronts a constant price and can sell all he wants at this price. 
32 For simplicity, we do not discuss the economic law of diminishing returns that shows how the marginal 
product of a variable factor will eventually reach a point where it begins to decline as more of the input is 
used.  A discussion of the law of diminishing returns can be found under the  Returns to a Factor section,  
beginning on page 101 of Managerial Economics and Organizational Architecture (2001) by James A. 
Brickley, Clifford W. Smith, Jr. and Jerold L. Zimmerman 
33 Of course, you could argue that some consumers might want different types of bread each day, and 
therefore buy different loaves each week; this example is purely theoretical for explanation. 
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 In order to theorize models for demand curves that multiproduct firms who 
produce substitutable products are subject to, let us think of a firm that produces two 
products.  Our two-product firm chooses to produce quantities X1 and X2 of two products, 
of which are sold in the market at prices P1 and P2, respectively.  Of course the firm 
wishes to maximize net revenues in its attempts to maximize profits, and therefore must 
try to price each product accordingly.  That is, the firm wants to find the optimal mixture 
of prices and quantities for each product, subject to the market demand curves of each 
product.  This is hard to accomplish because of the assumed substitutability of the two 
products, which says that the demand for product 1 goes up when the price of product 2 
goes up, and vice versa.34 
With all that said, the following is what the model of two linear demand curves 
looks like for a two-product firm with substitutable products35: 
X1  =  a1  –  b1P1  +  d1P2 
X2  =  a2  –  b2P2  +  d2P1 
The first equation is the demand function for product 1 subject to the prices of 
product 1 and product 2, i.e. P1 and P2.  It defines the quantity demanded, X1, of good 1 
subject to those market conditions. 
The second equation is the demand function for product 2 subject to the prices of 
product 2 and product 1, i.e. P2 and P1.  This equation defines the quantity demanded, X2, 
of good 2 subject to those market conditions. 
                                                 
34 Summarized from section 6.7 Substitutes and Complements, on page 111 of Intermediate 
Microeconomics (2003) by Hal R. Varian. 
35 Model courtesy of Dr. Mike Maloney, Professor of Economics at Clemson University. 
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 Manipulating the two demand functions, you can think about how they will look 
graphically.  Consider the following graphs in figure 3 for further explanation: 
 
Figure 3  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The above graphs in Figure 3 show each demand function from the model, with 
their x-intercepts defined and shown, as well as the slopes of the line.  These two graphs 
represent the linear market demand curves for each product, 1 and 2.  Notice the x-
intercept of the first graph is a function of the price in the second graph, and vice versa.  
This is because the two products are substitutable, so the price of product 1 is a function 
of the demand for product 2 and the price of product 2 is a function of the demand for 
product 1.  What would happen if the firm decided to lower the price of product 2?   
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 The law of demand says that a fall in the price of product 2 would cause the 
quantity demanded of product 2 to increase.  Furthermore, since the two products are 
substitutes, economic theory says that when there is an increase in quantity demand of 
product 2, there will be a decrease in demand of product 1.  More explicitly, since the 
demand for product 1 is a function of the price of product 2, when the price of product 2 
falls, the demand for product 1 also falls.  All this can be observed graphically, below in 
Figure 4.36 
Figure 4  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
36 These demand curves are theoretical.  Statistically, demand curves are not graphically linear like Figure 
3 and Figure 4 portray.  In What Do Statistical “Demand Curves” Show?,   E. J. Working discusses how 
demand curves are constructed, with corresponding prices and quantities, and how economists try to insert 
a best-fitted line through the statistical points of correspondence.  The linear curves in Figure 3 and Figure 
4 are theoretical, and are used to explain the idea behind the law of demand, as well as portray the average 
consumer’s speculative response to price changes. 
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 From the two graphs in Figure 4, you can observe what happens to the market 
demand for each product when the firm lowers the price of product 2.  You can see there 
is an inward shift in the demand for product 1 (shown in the top graph), i.e. a decrease in 
demand; you also see the movement downward along the demand curve for product 2 
(shown in the bottom graph).  This movement represents a greater quantity demanded 
when the price is lowered to P2*. 
 
The “Dank Dog” Experiment 
 
In order to research and test the model regarding the above topics and theories, I 
performed an economic experiment in the town of Clemson, South Carolina over nine 
weeks in the summer of 2007.  During these nine weeks, I managed and operated a 
licensed portable hot dog vending cart Monday through Friday, at lunchtime from 11:30 
AM to 1:30 PM37 and in the evenings, from 11:30 PM to 2:30 AM.  The cart and the 
business Dank Dogs LLC are owned by a close friend of mine38, who has been operating 
the business since the summer of 2005. 
The purpose of this experiment is to try to get an inclination on what is the 
optimal price for the hot dog, that is, to find the price that maximized profits to the firm.  
This is further complicated because we market two products, which are close substitutes.  
The two products are the “dank dog” and the “regular dog”, and the distinction is in the 
                                                 
37 Lunch operation was terminated after three weeks due to technical complications with the operation of 
the hand sink, as well as the average lunch operation was unprofitable.  This leads to an incomplete data set 
due to the missing lunchtime values. 
38 Steve Clery, a fraternity brother of mine is the owner and CEO of Dank Dogs LLC. 
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 amount of different toppings and condiments applied to each hot dog.  The dank dog 
includes an Oscar Mayer all-beef hot dog, beef chili, cheese, and FRITOS corn chips, as 
well as whatever other condiments the customer wants.  The regular dog is an Oscar 
Mayer all-beef hot dog, and any combination of the other condiments, which are ketchup, 
mustard, pickle relish, and chopped onions. 
Originally, the owner(s) set forth prices of $2.50 for the regular dog and $3.50 for 
the dank dog, which satisfied them as a profitable combination for their past 2 years of 
operation.  In order to attempt to find the optimal price combination to maximize profits, 
I vary the prices of each dog over the nine-week experiment, so that each price 
combination is marketed for each five-day week.  The Dank Dog Projected Price 
Variation Matrix, the price combinations and their respective dates marketed are shown 
on the following page in Table 1. 39 
 Table 1. 
Dank Dog Projected Price Variation Matrix 
$ 3.75 3.5 3.25 
2.75 8/2-8/8 7/19-7/25 6/18-6/22 
2.5 7/12-7/18 6/4-6/8 7/5-7/11 
2.25 6/11-6/15 7/26-8/1 6/26-6/30 
 
 
 
 
Over the nine weeks, each sale of either dog is recorded by tallying at each price.  
I also record the sales revenues for each shift, as well as the amount of tips received.  
                                                 
39 The values across the top row represent prices of the Dank Dog; the values down the first column 
represent prices of the regular hot dog.  Each cell has a week assignment, and corresponding price 
combinations, which is represented by the date.  I.E. the cell’ 6/11-6/15’ means that the regular hot dog 
price was $2.25 and the Dank Dog price was $3.75 for the week beginning Monday, June 11th and ending 
after Friday June 15 th. 
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 Additionally, I make notes about the evenings, if anything was out of the ordinary.  I 
wanted notes on each shift so that in the final analysis I could try to explain severe up or 
down swings in sales. 
 
Dank Dogs LLC, The Law of Demand, and Price Elasticity 
  
 Just like all firms, Dank Dogs is of course, subject to the law of demand.  
Therefore, we expect to observe an inverse relationship between the prices of each type 
hot dog and their respective quantities sold. 
 You could estimate the elasticities of demand for the daytime and nighttime 
consumer.  Theoretically, economists would say that the elasticities do not change 
between night and day, because consumer’s incomes do not change between night and 
day.  In reality, the price elasticities probably do change.  This is because of the nature of 
the daytime versus the nighttime consumer.  It is also because of the market conditions 
during the daytime versus the nighttime, which will be further discussed in the next 
section on monopoly. 
 On average, I observed the daytime consumers to be a mix of students, professors, 
and employees of downtown businesses, of all ages; therefore many different types of 
consumers all with an undoubtedly different price elasticities of demand for hot dogs.   
This group is not the same as the nighttime consumers.   
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 On average, the nighttime consumers were those either going to, or coming from 
the bars in downtown Clemson.  This means that this group should be40 at least 21 years 
old.  Further, you might make the assumption that the consumption of alcohol makes a 
consumer less rational, and his demand more inelastic.  Whether or not that is true, it 
must be mentioned that the daytime consumer is observed to be different than the 
nighttime consumer for those stated reasons.  
 
Dank Dogs LLC as a Monopoly 
 
Using the previous definition and discussions on monopoly, I recognized that 
Dank Dogs LLC operates in a monopolistic market, and prices should reflect its 
monopoly power.  I consider the market to be foodservice establishments within the close 
proximity of downtown Clemson, of which, there are no other hot dog vendors. 
During the day, the monopoly is not as easily accomplished because there are 
many bars and restaurants within the direct vicinity that produce food items like 
sandwiches and subs, which could be argued as close substitutes to hot dogs.  
Furthermore, if the consumer is willing to drive to get a hot dog, SKINS, a known local 
hot dog vendor sells hot dogs for $1.25 each, and is approximately two miles from Dank 
Dogs. 
                                                 
40 I say should be because, due to the law in Clemson, SC, in order to get into the bar after 10 PM, you must 
present your identification to verify that you are at least 21 years old.  There are an unknown number of 
consumers who present false identification; but we assume the average nighttime consumer to be 21 years 
old or older.  
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   At night however, the monopoly is truly evident, as all the daytime competitors 
close up shop in the evenings.  In fact, there is really only one direct competitor41 to 
Dank Dogs, which is an all night sandwich shop called Beezer’s, located directly adjace
to where the Dank Dogs operation is.  Because we observe, at least in the evenings, Dan
Dogs is a monopoly, I should be able to charge a higher price than the competitive 
market for hot dogs; that is, higher than the $1.25 price per hot dog that SKINS charges 
during the day. 
nt 
k 
                                                
 
Price Discrimination and the Dank Dog Experiment 
 
 The Dank Dog experiment, as it was conducted, utilized price discrimination in 
order to measure consumer’s price elasticity of demand of two types of hot dogs, and 
thereby find the optimal prices to maximize profits.  Considering the previously 
presented definitions of price discrimination, you may see how the Dank Dogs 
experiment was effectively price discriminating between each week of operation.  For 
simplicity’s sake, I will elaborate using the three principles necessary for a firm to 
practice discrimination, with respect to Dank Dogs as the firm in question. 
 First, as said before, the firm must have some market power.  As discussed in the 
section of Dank Dogs as a Monopoly, this is much harder to do during lunchtime because 
the number of competitors is large.  At lunch, there are numerous bars and restaurants 
 
41 By ‘competitors’ I am referring to just those firms who sell food products past 12 AM, not the usual 
definition pertaining to firms in the same industry.  By that definition, Dank Dogs is a monopoly because 
there are no other late night hot dog vendors. 
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 within the immediate vicinity that offer sandwiches, subs, and other competing lunchtime 
food products.  During the evening hours, this market power problem is accomplished 
easily, and is probably the reason for much greater successes in sales at night.  Because 
the night shift begins at 11:30 PM and goes till 2:30 AM, there are few competing entities 
within walking distance that serve food at these hours.  As a matter of fact, after midnight 
in downtown Clemson, the only food products that can be purchased are either from 
Dank Dogs or the all night sandwich shop Beezer’s.  Because there are only two 
competitors, and our average price per one unit of food (a hot dog) is lower than their 
average price per one unit (a sandwich), Dank Dogs enjoys a good bit of market share.42 
 Secondly, Dank Dogs must have an inclination on the consumer’s willingness to 
pay per unit.  First of all, Dank Dogs has operated many nights since the summer of 2005.  
For two years they have been profitable with the benchmark prices of $2.50 for the 
regular hot dog and $3.50 for the dank dog.  Therefore, I began the experiment with a 
fairly good idea of consumer’s willingness to pay at the previously established prices.  
Further, the lack of competition in the late night food market would suggest that the 
consumers would have more inelastic demand curves for each product, and by definition 
be more willing to pay whatever the quoted price is.  Finally, if you accept that the 
majority of sales at night are from consumers going to, or leaving the local bars, you 
could assume that they have consumed alcohol.  As previously discussed, if we assume 
that alcohol consumption makes a consumer less rational, then their demand curve for 
                                                 
42 From this argument you might say that Dank Dogs takes 50% of the market share, but that assumption 
would be incorrect.  Beezer’s offers a wide variety of sandwiches, while Dank Dogs only offers two 
different types of hot dogs.  Also, Beezer’s offers delivery services and accepts credit/debit cards, while 
Dank Dogs serve the passersby and accept cash only.  Because of the greater number of products and 
services, Beezer’s most definitely takes more of the late night food market share. 
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 after-hours food products should be more inelastic and therefore making the willingness 
to pay at whatever price greater. 
 Lastly, in order to price discriminate, Dank Dogs must be able to prevent resales.  
This is easily done because hot dogs are time finite goods.  Once they are served, they 
only stay hot for a short period of time, and are really only enjoyable to consume shortly 
after purchasing, on the same day.  This makes resales almost impossible, because a 
consumer cannot buy cheap hot dogs one week, and sell them for a profit at a later date.  
Also, there is no rational reason why a consumer would buy multiple hot dogs and 
attempt to re-sell them at a higher price (in an attempt to make a profit), when Dank Dogs 
operates till 2:30 AM.   
You could argue that an opportunistic consumer might buy a large quantity in the 
attempt to resell them after operating hours.  This would be a tough argument because 
when the bars close promptly at 2:00 AM, the streets are usually deserted when I finally 
close up shop around 2:30 AM, and there wouldn’t be much of a market and therefore 
much of an opportunity for that consumer.43 
 
Dank Dogs and Substitutable Products 
 
 For the following, refer to the theories, two models, and arguments presented in 
the section entitled Multiproduct Empirical Models with Substitutable Products starting 
on page 19 of the THEORY section. 
                                                 
43 You could speculate about other opportunistic scenarios in which resales might occur, such as buying hot 
dogs and re-selling them within the bars, but I have not observed anything like this. 
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  As part of the hypothesis of this paper, I postulate that the two products Dank 
Dogs produces are substitutable, to an extent, of which I hope to measure with the data.  
Each product is a hot dog, although the dank dog has a greater amount of different 
condiments on it.  For that reason, I assume that holding prices constant, the dank dog is 
more desired than the regular dog.44 
 In this experiment however, prices are not constant, I vary them each week.  If the 
two products, the dank dog and the regular dog, are substitutable, we expect to see 
consumers react accordingly to the changes in price.  Thinking in terms of the theoretical 
graphs of the demand curves of substitutable products presented earlier in the paper45, I 
expect the same kinds of shifts in demand, and increases/decreases in quantities with the 
firm Dank Dogs LLC.    
More explicitly, I expect that increases in the price of the dank dog will not only 
have the usual reaction of a diminishing quantity demanded of the dank dog, but also will 
incite a greater quantity demanded of the regular dog.  Of course I also expect increases 
in the price of the regular dog to not only decrease its quantity demanded, but also 
increase the quantity demanded of the dank dog.46 
 
                                                 
44 This assumption may or may not be valid; the data and analysis results should reveal its validity. 
45 Refer to figure 3 on page 21, and figure 4 on page 22. 
46 Of course these expectations propose the validity of the counterarguments regarding decreases in the 
price of either dog, having similar effects on its quantity demanded, and the demand for the other dog. 
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 Dank Dogs and Costs 
 
 In order to consider Dank Dogs in the sense of profitability, costs must be 
assigned and defined, if they can be.  Of course, as previously presented, assessing 
average costs will be difficult because of the multiple products Dank Dogs produces. 
 I performed a variable cost analysis with the first six and a half weeks of receipts 
and sales data.47  The majority of inputs for Dank Dogs were purchased at Sam’s Club, in 
Anderson, SC, where they market large quantities of input goods at wholesale prices, as 
long you have a membership card, of which Dank Dogs LLC has.  The goal of my cost 
analysis was to try and find the accounting cost of each of the two products, the dank dog, 
and the regular hot dog; in real dollar terms. 
I used the receipts from Sam’s Club from May 31st, when I began the experiment, 
to July 20th, about two-thirds of the way through the total experiment timeline.  On the 
spreadsheet, the inputs used were tallied and multiplied by their respective prices.  I 
included all costs that were not fixed or sunk during this period, and allocated them as 
either fixed/common costs or variable costs.  The fixed, or common costs reflect things 
like napkins, wax paper (in which we serve each dog), and taxes and fees regarding 
monthly operations.  You can also see costs associated with gas.  This is a $5.00 fee 
applied and paid to myself for each trip made for Dank Dogs LLC to Sam’s Club in my 
car.48 
                                                 
47 Cost analysis tables pertaining to the following discussion can be found on page 53 and 54 in the 
appendix. 
48 This is not divisible by $5.00 because there was one $3.00 gas expenditure to compensate a trip to Wal-
Mart, which is a shorter distance than to Sam’s Club. 
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 The variable costs reflect all the inputs that varied with each unit sold, like chili, 
hot dogs, buns, and other condiments.  Here, arises the problem of common costs 
previously discussed. 
Since the regular hot dog and the dank dog are both hot dogs on buns, the hot 
dogs themselves and the buns are economically considered common costs in the 
production line of Dank Dogs.  Furthermore, the other condiments, the relish, mustard, 
ketchup, and onions could be requested by the consumer to be put on either product, so 
those are technically common costs as well.  For lack of a better way to deal with this 
problem, I assigned weights to these common costs.49 
It was easy to weight the hot dogs and buns, because I have the sales records of 
the quantity of each sold.50  The cost analysis reflects that the percentage of dank dogs 
produced was 0.7544 of the total quantity of dank dogs and regular hot dogs sold.  That is 
why the weight for the dank dog, 0.75 on the spreadsheet, is applied to the total cost of 
hot dogs and hot dog buns.  Alternatively, the 0.25 weight of the regular hot dog is 
applied to the total cost of both hot dogs and buns, and the cost of the hot dogs and buns 
for the regular hot dog can also be seen in the spreadsheet. 
The other inputs for the dank dog, the chili, cheese, and fritos, get a weight of 1.0 
because they are used solely for the production of dank dogs; the consumer cannot 
request these items placed on a regular hot dog, they must pay the dank dog price for 
these items. 
                                                 
49 See the Dwght and Rwght columns in Table 14 on page 53 in the appendix. 
50 Of course, with the previous sales records, you can do this weighting of common input costs without 
difficulty; but forecasting the costs before sales periods would be much more difficult. 
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 Dank Dogs and Profit Maximization 
 
 Accepting that Dank Dogs is a monopoly, economic theory tells us that in order to 
maximize profits, price should be set where marginal revenue equals marginal cost.  This 
is further complicated because Dank Dogs is a multiproduct firm. 
 This experiment is performed in order to assess which price combination 
maximized profits.  Because it is very difficult to measure opportunity costs to my 
employees and me, calculating marginal cost of each product is almost impossible.  This 
means that attempting to set price where marginal revenue equals marginal cost is hard to 
do, and thus experimenting with prices to find the optimum is the scope of this 
experiment. 
 Of course, as with any multiproduct firm, Profits are maximized when the 
optimum price of each product is found, and therefore quantity supplied to the market is 
optimized.  Since Dank Dogs has substitutable products, I want to price each product 
accordingly pertaining to their respective costs.  Theoretically, because the profit margins 
on the dank dog are much higher51 than those on the regular dog I want all the consumers 
to buy dank dogs in order to maximize the profits.  In order to coerce the consumers to 
buy all dank dogs I have to be careful not to overprice the regular dog so that regular dog 
demanders are not deterred from purchasing.  Further, I want to avoid overpricing the 
                                                 
51 The Total Variable Cost Analysis (Table 16 on page 54) in the appendix shows that an average dank dog 
costs $1.65 and the average regular dog costs $1.45.  Since the average price is $3.50 and $2.50 
respectively, the bigger return is on sales of the dank dog. 
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 dank dog to deter consumers from substituting the cheaper, regular dog for the more 
expensive dank dog, lowering profits to the firm. 
I will talk more about profit maximization when I discuss the results and I find the 
optimal price combination that maximizes revenues and profits. 
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 DATA 
 
The data is a set of 43 observations, representing nine weeks of operation on 
Monday through Friday evenings of the summer of 2007.  Originally, the data was 
supposed to include lunch shifts, but because lunch operation had to be terminated, I have 
omitted all lunchtime observations from the data set.  
The data was compiled and sorted by each evening of operation.  For each night 
(observation), there is the quantity of dank dogs sold, the quantity of regular dogs sold, 
the price of the dank dog for that evening, the price of the regular dog for that evening, as 
well as the amount of net revenues and the amount of tips received. 
For ease of analysis, I included a column in which each day of the week is 
assigned to a corresponding number.  The number 1 is for a Monday, 2 for a Tuesday, 3 
for a Wednesday, 4 for a Thursday, and 5 for a Friday.  Therefore next to the date column, 
there is a day column with numbers 1-5 repeating.  This was also so that I could use day 
of the week dummies in the regression analysis, which will be discussed in the following 
pages.   
There is also a column pdiff, which represents the value of the difference in price 
between the dank dog and the regular dog for that particular day.   
Although the cart was easily mobile, I used the same location for the whole 
summer, for each shift, in order to keep the experiment as controlled as possible.  Also, 
Dank Dogs also sell sodas and bottles of water.  I keep their prices the same, and don’t 
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 include their sales in the data set because the amount of sales is trivial, but also as a 
controlling factor. 
There are two missing Monday evenings in the data set.  The first is Monday, 
June 4th, when I was out of town, and therefore operation ceased for that day.  The second 
missing Monday, June 25th was due to thunderstorms during operating hours; as the 
operation is outside, heavy rain/thunderstorms would not only kill business downtown, 
but also terminate the operation of Dank Dogs for the evening. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
     36 
 RESULTS AND ANALYSIS 
A presentation of the results from the’ Dank Dog Experiment’ using different forms of 
analysis. 
 
Summary Statistics 
 
 The following table contains the summary statistics of the dataset. 
Table 2.     
Data Summary Statistics 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Day 44 3.02 1.45 0 5 
# Dank Sold 43 18.86 6.96 6 33 
# Reg. Sold 43 5.84 3.57 0 13 
Price Dank 44 3.5 0.21 3.25 3.75 
Price Regular 44 2.47 0.19 2.25 2.75 
Revenues 43 81.09 29.87 24.5 148.5 
Tips 44 17.21 7.5 2 31.25 
Price Differences 43 1.03 0.28 0.5 1.5 
  
As you can see, there were 43 total observations.  My projected price variation 
matrix suggested 45 observations, nine different weekly price combinations, and five 
days each week; but as previously discussed, there are two Mondays missing.  During the 
summer of 2007, Dank Dogs averaged $81.09 in revenues per night, and the operators 
received an average of $17.21 in tips each night.  The worst night all summer brought in 
$24.50 in revenues, and the best night $148.50 in revenues. Over the summer of 2007, we 
sold an average of 18.86 dank dogs per evening, and 5.84 regular dogs per evening, at 
average prices of $3.50 and $2.47. 
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 Regression Analyses 
  
Before presenting the regression results, let us briefly revisit the two models from 
the theory section that we will be subjecting the dataset to and using in the regression: 
X1  =  a1  –  b1P1  +  d1P2 
X2  =  a2  –  b2P2  +  d2P1 
Now, I will use robust linear regression analysis to analyze the data subject to the 
two models52.  Here, X1 will be the quantity of dank dogs sold and X2 the quantity of 
regular dogs sold.  Additionally, P1 will be the price of the dank dog and P2 the price of 
the regular dog.  
Observe the following results from the first regression using the first formula 
where the number of dank dogs sold is the independent variable. 
 
Table 3.      
Regression of Prices of Both Dogs Explaining Number of Dank Dogs 
Sold 
Linear Regression   Number of obs  = 43 
    F(  2,   41)        = 0.33 
    Prob > F          = .072 
    R-squared        = 0.01 
      Root MSE        =  7.33 
  
# Dank Coef. T P > t 
[95% conf. 
Interval] 
Price Dank -1.48 -0.3 0.77 -11.49 8.53 
Price Regular 3.53 0.68 0.5 -6.89 13.95 
constant 15.01 0.64 0.53 -32.44 62.45 
 
                                                 
52 All regression analysis performed, and results generated with STATA/SE version 9.2, licensed to John 
Warner, Clemson University – Department of Economics. 
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 From the first regression results, you see what economic theory predicts, and the 
signs of the parameter estimates agree.  While neither explanatory variable’s estimate is 
statistically significant at the 5 or 10% levels, the coefficients are still theoretically 
significant.  On average, a $1 increase in the price of the dank dog decreases the number 
sold each night by 1.48.  Also, on average, a $1 increase in the price of the regular dog 
shows a 3.53 increase in the number of dank dogs sold each night, as the consumer 
substitutes away from the increase in price. 
Now, I perform the linear regression using the second formula, making the 
number of regular dogs the independent variable. 
 
Table 4.     
Regression of Prices of Both Dogs Explaining Number of Regular 
Dogs Sold 
Linear Regression   Number of obs  = 43 
    F(  2,   41)        = 3.17 
    Prob > F          = .053 
    R-squared        = 0.11 
      Root MSE        =  3.463 
  
# Regular Coef. T P > t 
[95% conf. 
Interval] 
Price Dank 5.21 2.07 0.045 0.124 10.29 
Price Regular -2.34 -0.91 0.37 -7.55 2.87 
Constant -6.71 -0.56 0.581 -31.07 17.65 
 
From the second regression results, again you see what I expected, and what 
economic theory predicted, although this regression is more statistically significant than 
the first one.  On average, a $1 increase in the price of a dank dog increased the average 
quantity of regular dogs sold each night by 5.21, and is statistically significant at the 5% 
level. Also relevant, but with much less statistical significance, a $1 average increase in 
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 the price of a regular dog decreased the average quantity of regular dogs sold by 2.34 per 
night. 
Now, I insert dummy variables into the data to control for each day of the week.  
This is in order to control for daily effects, like Monday night sales versus Friday night 
sales.  The following table has regression results from the first regression with day 
dummies controlling for each day relative to Friday (dday5 in the data). 
 
Table 5.     
Regression of Prices of Both Dogs With Day Dummies (relative to 
Friday) Explaining Number of Dank Dogs Sold 
Linear Regression   Number of obs  = 43 
    F(  6,   36)        = 4.03 
    Prob > F           =  0.0034 
    R-squared        = 0.29 
      Root MSE        =  6.32 
  
# Dank Coef. T P > t 
[95% conf. 
Interval] 
Price Dank -1.88 -0.04 0.7 -11.51 7.76 
Price Regular 3.34 0.67 0.51 -6.78 13.47 
Monday 2.95 1.17 0.25 -2.17 8.08 
Tuesday 5.61 2.04 0.05 0.05 11.18 
Wednesday -4.94 -1.7 0.1 -10.84 0.96 
Thursday -1.05 -0.3 0.77 -8.21 6.11 
constant 16.68 0.86 0.397 -22.79 56.16 
 
 As you can see in Table 5, the signs stayed the same, and the parameter estimates 
are theoretically significant.  The estimates changed slightly from the first regression in 
Table 3.  The coefficient on the price of dank dogs went from -1.48 in the first regression, 
to -1.88, although it became more significant in this more controlled regression, going 
from 0.77 to 0.7.   The coefficient on the price of regular dogs went from 3.53 in the first 
regression, to 3.34 in this regression, and is still not statistically significant. 
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  The data dummies are more confusing, and more statistically significant.  Holding 
Friday night constant, on average, the highest quantity of dank dogs sold each night 
occurs Tuesday with significance at the 5% level.  Monday night was the runner-up, but 
was not statistically significant.  Wednesday night has a large statistically significant 
effect on dank dog sales of -4.94 on the average Wednesday, significant at the 10% level.  
Thursday, one night away from the weekend, and a typical “going out” night in Clemson 
(and most colleges), also shows an average effect of -1.05 dank dog sales on average, 
although it is not significant. 
Since I have previously assumed that the average consumer is going to or coming 
from a bar, you would think that later in the week would be busier, that is if you assume 
bars are busier later on in the week.  Of course, that assumption could be contradicted 
with information about the bars and the market area.  Dank Dogs operates downtown 
next to bars in what is commonly referred to as a “college town”; meaning there isn’t 
much else in town unless it is related somehow to the university.  This leads me to 
believe that the average customer is somehow related to the university, most likely a 
student.  Students most definitely do not have “normal” schedules per se, which might 
help to explain the unevenness of the dummy estimates. 
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 Table 6.     
Regression of Prices of Both Dogs With Day Dummies (relative to 
Friday) Explaining Number of Regular Dogs Sold 
Linear Regression   Number of obs  = 43 
    F(  6,   36)        = 9.75 
    Prob > F          = 0.00 
    R-squared        = 0.41 
      Root MSE        =  2.96 
  
# Regular Coef. T P > t 
[95% conf. 
Interval] 
Price Dank 5.08 2.49 0.02 0.94 9.22 
Price Regular -2.42 -1.11 0.28 -6.85 2.01 
Monday 1.04 0.56 0.58 -2.75 4.83 
Tuesday 3.05 2.14 0.04 0.17 5.93 
Wednesday -2.84 -2.15 0.04 -5.52 -0.16 
Thursday -0.17 -0.1 0.918 -3.53 3.19 
constant -6.18 -0.67 0.51 -24.9 12.56 
 
 The coefficient estimates of the regression results in Table 6 are much like Table 
5 just not as extreme.  Again, these are regression results holding Friday constant 
throughout, with the number of regular dogs sold as the independent variable this time.  
The results show that the average Wednesday or Thursday still have negative effects 
when measuring average regular dog sales, but only Wednesday’s coefficient is 
statistically significant at the 5% level.  The best average regular dog sales also appear, 
with statistical significance at the 5% level, on Tuesday nights, as did the best average 
dank dog sales in Table 5; although the number of regular dog sales isn’t as strong (3.05 
vs. 5.61 in the previous regression).  On average, regular dog sales are second best on 
Monday night, the same as the dank dog sales, although again the effect of regular dog 
sales isn’t as strong (1.04 vs. 2.95). 
 After reviewing the above results, I thought it might be a good idea to investigate 
the effects the day dummies had on gross revenues and tips in order to validate what the 
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 above regression results suggested about the average Wednesday and Thursday.  The 
following Table 7 is the regression using the day dummies, holding Friday constant, and 
using the total nightly revenues as the independent variable.   
 
Table 7.     
Regression of Day Dummies (relative to Friday) Explaining Nightly 
Revenues  
Linear Regression   Number of obs  = 43 
    F(  6,   36)        = 5.93 
    Prob > F          = 0.0008 
    R-squared        = 0.31 
      Root MSE        =  26.04 
  
Revenues Coef. T P > t 
[95% conf. 
Interval] 
Monday 14.5 1.15 0.26 -10.99 39.99 
Tuesday 24.41 1.95 0.06 -0.92 49.73 
Wednesday -22.59 -1.89 0.07 -46.85 1.66 
Thursday -5.18 -0.35 0.073 -35.27 24.92 
Constant 79.09 8.1 0 59.31 98.87 
 
 The results in Table 7 validate the previous regression results, which showed that, 
holding Friday constant, the average Wednesday was the worst night of the week, 
followed by Thursday.  Also, Tuesdays still appear to be the best nights on average, with 
Monday following somewhat close behind. 
 If you assume that more revenues brings more tips, the tips regression results 
should look a lot like the above revenues regression results in Table 7. 
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 Table 8. 
Regression of Day Dummies (relative to Friday) Explaining Nightly 
Tips 
Linear Regression   Number of obs  = 43 
    F(  6,   36)        = 6.62 
    Prob > F          = 0.0004 
    R-squared        = 0.33 
      Root MSE        =  6.44 
  
Tips Coef. T P > t 
[95% conf. 
Interval] 
Monday 2.22 0.64 0.527 -4.82 9.26 
Tuesday 6.25 2.02 0.05 -0.01 12.51 
Wednesday -6.58 -2.64 0.01 -11.63 -1.53 
Thursday -0.74 3.05 0.81 -6.93 5.44 
constant 17.03 8.3 0 12.87 21.18 
 
 The coefficients on the daily dummies in Table 8 are as expected from the insight 
gained from the previous regression results in Table 7.  Holding Friday constant, on 
average, Tuesday is still the best day, now for a new factor of success, tips.  Same as 
before, an average Monday is second best while holding Friday constant.  Wednesday is 
again the worst day, on average, with Thursday right behind it. 
 
Sales and Profits 
 
 From the sales numbers for the summer of 2007, and using the cost analysis 
attached to this paper, there is no question that Dank Dogs is a profitable enterprise.  
With its few competitors and monopoly power in the market, Dank Dogs effectively 
prices its products above their marginal cost, which increase the profit margins on each 
product greatly.  While it was observed that Dank Dogs is profitable at all the price 
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 combinations that I presented to the market, let us revisit the original question of which 
combination maximized the firm’s profits?  See Table 9 below for explanation: 
 
Table 9.       
Quantities, Revenues, Cost, and Profits By Week 
Week 
Dank 
Price 
Regular 
Price 
Q 
Dank 
Q 
Regular Revenues Cost Profits 
6/4-6/8 $3.50 $2.50 86 35 $406.00 $192.65 $213.35 
6/11-6/15 $3.75 $2.25 102 41 $473.75 $227.75 $247.00 
6/18-6/22 $3.25 $2.75 120 22 $457.25 $229.90 $227.35 
6/25-6/29 $3.25 $2.25 79 22 $309.00 $162.25 $146.75 
7/5-7/11 $3.25 $2.50 70 19 $275.75 $143.05 $132.70 
7/12-7/18 $3.75 $2.50 75 43 $392.50 $186.10 $206.40 
7/19-7/25 $3.50 $2.75 89 26 $388.75 $184.55 $204.20 
7/26-8/1 $3.50 $2.25 91 20 $346.50 $179.15 $167.35 
8/2-8/8 $3.75 $2.75 99 23 $437.25 $196.70 $240.55 
TOTAL   816 253 $3,492.75 $1,713.25 $1,779.50 
 The above table shows the revenues and profits for each week of operation during 
the summer of 2007.  It also shows the price marketed for both the dank dog and the 
regular dog, during each corresponding week.  The values in the column ‘Q Dank’ 
represent the quantities of dank dogs sold during each respective week.  The values in the 
column ‘Q Regular’ represent the quantities of regular dogs sold during each respective 
week. 
 The values in the revenues column represent the total weekly revenues for each 
corresponding week.  They are calculated by summing the revenues from dank dog sales 
and regular dog sales.53 Expressed numerically: 
Revenues ($)  =  (dank price x q dank)  +  (regular price x q regular)  +  drinks 
                                                 
53 Drink prices and sales are not included in the table because they didn’t change and therefore were 
constant conditions of the experiment.  Also, such a small quantity of drinks was sold each week, that the 
corresponding weekly revenues generated from drink sales are a trivial amount. 
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 The values in the ‘Cost’ column were calculated with the average costs for each 
type of hot dog from the cost analysis spreadsheet in the appendix.  Meaning, costs for 
each week are calculated by the following formula: 
Week’s Costs ($)   =   (Qdank x 1.65)  +  (Qregular x 1.45) 
Of course, the profits column is simply the revenues subtracted from the costs.  
As you can see from the table, the most weekly profits, $247.00, were generated during 
the week starting June 11th and ending June 16th.  During this week, the prices were $3.75 
for the dank dog, and $2.25 for the regular dog, meaning there was a $1.50 difference in 
the price of the two products.  I observed $473.75 in net weekly revenues at those prices, 
$36.50 greater than the next most profitable week, from August 2nd to August 8th. 
There is a problem with the above Table 9 and its discussion.  As mentioned in 
the data discussion, there is a missing data point for Monday June 4th, and Monday June 
25th.  In order to attempt to correct for these missing values, I present the weekly data in a 
daily average format.  See Table 10 on the following page. 
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 Table 10.     
Average Daily Quantities, Revenues, Cost, and Profits 
Week 
Dank 
Price 
Regular 
Price Q Dank 
Q 
Regular Revenues Cost Profits 
6/4-6/8 $3.50 $2.50 21.5 8.75 $101.50 $48.16 $53.34 
6/11-6/15 $3.75 $2.25 20.4 8.2 $94.95 $45.55 $49.40 
6/18-6/22 $3.25 $2.75 24 4.4 $91.45 $45.98 $45.47 
6/25-6/29 $3.25 $2.25 19.75 5.5 $77.25 $40.56 $36.69 
7/5-7/11 $3.25 $2.50 14 3.8 $55.15 $28.61 $26.54 
7/12-7/18 $3.75 $2.50 15 8.6 $78.50 $37.22 $41.28 
7/19-7/25 $3.50 $2.75 17.8 5.2 $77.75 $36.91 $40.84 
7/26-8/1 $3.50 $2.25 18.2 4 $69.30 $35.83 $33.47 
8/2-8/8 $3.75 $2.75 19.8 4.6 $87.45 $39.34 $48.11 
TOTAL   18.86 5.84 $81.09 $39.58 $41.53 
 
 From Table 10, I have found that the best daily average, with respect to profits, is 
obtained during the first week when the prices are $3.50 for the dank dog, and $2.50 for 
the regular dog.  That price combination produced the highest average daily revenues as 
well as the highest average daily profits, which is really the parameter I am most 
interested in. 
 Another interesting way to look at the data is to find the average revenues, sales, 
and tips per each day of the week.  These can be seen below in Table 11. 
 
Table 11.    
Day of the Week Averages of Sales, Revenues, and Tips 
Day # Dank Sold # Reg Sold Revs Tips 
Monday 21.43 6.29 $ 92.89 $ 20.15 
Tuesday 24 8.67 $ 103.5 $ 23.28 
Wednesday 13.44 2.78 $ 56.5 $ 10.44 
Thursday 17.33 5.44 $ 73.92 $ 16.28 
Friday 16.89 5.22 $ 73.03 $ 15.13 
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 Here in Table 11 you see the data in this format agrees with the multiple 
regression analyses, as it should.  Once again, on average, Tuesday appears as the best 
night for sales of each product, as well as for the highest revenues and highest tips.
 While Tuesday and Monday were found to be the best days on average, what 
about the best day of each week, at each price combination?  See Table 12 for the best 
days of each week. 
 
  
Table 12. 
Best Days of Each Week in Terms of Revenues and Profits 
Week Best Day 
Dank 
Price 
Regular 
Price 
Q 
Dank 
Q 
Regular Revenues Cost Profits 
6/4-6/8 Friday $3.50 $2.50 32 10 $137.00 $67.3 $69.70 
6/11-6/15 Friday $3.75 $2.25 25 10 $116.25 $55.75 $60.50 
6/18-6/22 Thursday $3.25 $2.75 27 6 $105.25 $53.25 $52.00 
6/25-6/29 Thursday $3.25 $2.25 25 7 $98.75 $51.40 $47.35 
7/5-7/11 Friday $3.25 $2.50 21 10 $93.25 $49.15 $44.10 
7/12-7/18 Wednesday $3.75 $2.50 16 13 $92.50 $45.25 $47.25 
7/19-7/25 Friday $3.50 $2.75 29 10 $130.00 $62.35 $67.65 
7/26-8/1 Friday $3.50 $2.25 29 9 $121.75 $60.90 $60.85 
8/2-8/8 Friday $3.75 $2.75 33 9 $148.50 $67.50 $81.00 
TOTAL    237 84 $1,043.25 $512.85  $530.40 
From Table 12 you see that Friday is most often the best day of each week, at all 
prices.  In the table, you might notice that, while Friday wasn’t the best night every week, 
each price of each dog was associated with a Friday that was the best night of that week.    
You can also see the best night of the summer, the last Friday during the week of 8/2-8/8, 
in the last row of Table 12. 
 I also want to present a table showing the last day of each price combination.  
This is to see how the last day of each week, when the consumer is most likely to 
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 anticipate the weekly price (because its been marketed all week), differs from the best 
days of the week.  The last day of the week sales, profits, and revenues can be found 
below in Table 13. 
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Table 13.  
Last Days of Each Weekly Price Combination 
Week Last Day 
Dank 
Price 
Regular 
Price 
Q 
Dank 
Q 
Regular Revenues Cost Profits 
6/4-6/8 Friday $3.50 $2.50 32 10 $137.00 $67.30 $69.70 
6/11-6/15 Friday $3.75 $2.25 25 10 $116.25 $55.75 $60.50 
6/18-6/22 Friday $3.25 $2.75 22 5 $116.25 $43.55 $72.70 
6/25-6/29 Friday $3.25 $2.25 17 5 $66.50 $35.30 $31.20 
7/5-7/11 Wednesday $3.25 $2.50 9 2 $34.25 $17.75 $16.50 
7/12-7/18 Wednesday $3.75 $2.50 16 13 $92.50 $45.25 $47.25 
7/19-7/25 Wednesday $3.50 $2.75 14 1 $51.75 $24.55 $27.20 
7/26-8/1 Wednesday $3.50 $2.25 20 3 $76.75 $37.35 $39.40 
8/2-8/8 Wednesday $3.75 $2.75 24 6 $108.50 $48.30 $60.20 
TOTAL    179 55 $799.75 $375.10 $424.65
 Comparing Table 12 and Table 13, I arrive at an interesting result.  It seems that 
revenues and profits aren’t really affected when consumers most anticipate the prices (i.e. 
the last day the price combination was marketed).  Of course, The first four rows, the 
Fridays, are much better than the last five rows of Wednesdays; as we have previously 
established Wednesday as the worst day of the week on average.   Because it seems that 
price anticipation by the consumer doesn’t have much to do with sales or profits, this 
                                                 
54 Notice that the “last days” change from Friday to Wednesday after the week ending June 29th.  This is 
because, as discussed in the data section, I left town for the 4th of July, so the new week began on a 
Thursday, July 5th.  From then on, new price combinations started on Thursday night, and the last night for 
each combination was, naturally, Wednesday; so that each combination was marketed each night, Monday-
Friday. 
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 furthers my hypothesis that the average consumer’s demand is fairly inelastic.  It also 
gives rise to an inclination that Dank Dogs might want to vary price per day.55 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
55 Of course, varying per day would have other effects not discussed or speculated here.  One would have to 
experiment with that to find out, but from Table 13 it seems that sales don’t vary much on the day when 
consumers are most likely to anticipate the prices. 
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 CONCLUSIONS 
 
 From the multitude of regression analyses, I found that even though the firm Dank 
Dogs LLC is operating in monopolistic market conditions, it is still just like any 
multiproduct firm, and is subject to the law of demand.  I observed an inverse 
relationship between its products and their respective prices; when the price of one 
product goes up, its quantity sold goes down, holding all else constant.  Looking at the 
regression results in Table 6 on page 42, I find that, on average, when the price of the 
dank dog is increased a dollar, about five more regular dogs are sold.  That result was 
found with statistical significance, while a conversely statistically significant result 
pertaining to an increase in the price of a regular dog was not found.  This suggests that 
the Dank Dog has a stronger substitutive effect that is being found in the regression 
analysis, of which leads to the next finding. 
 It was found that consumers prefer the dank dog to the regular dog.  There was 
not a single evening where there were more sales of regular dogs than sales of dank dogs, 
regardless of the marketed price for either.  Table 9 on page 45 shows that over the entire 
summer, there were over three times the amount of dank dogs sold than the amount of 
regular dogs sold. 
 As for suggested pricing strategy, Dank Dogs LLC could pursue multiple.  Of 
course, Dank Dogs LLC should price each dog according to where the greatest profits are 
realized.  Table 10 on page 47 shows that the greatest average daily profits were earned 
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 during the week where the dank dog was priced at $3.50 and the regular at $2.50.  
Therefore that pricing strategy should serve as a general rule. 
 Dank Dogs LLC could also pursue pricing appropriate to the evening.  The 
multiply regression analyses showed that Tuesday was the best night each week on 
average and that Wednesday was the worst.  Dank Dogs LLC might want to run some 
special on Wednesday to influence customers to buy. 
 A more radical strategy would be to expand the range of toppings and price all 
dogs the same, say $3.50, which would be inclusive of any combination of toppings.  Of 
course this would extremely exploit the minority of regular dog consumers, but I found 
the average consumer prefers the dank dog anyhow.  In the cost analysis, I found that 
many of the toppings add a trivial cost to the final product.  Intelligently expanding the 
toppings available might add more value to the product for all consumers, while 
minimally increasing cost and greatly increasing revenues. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
     52 
 APPENDIX 
 
 
Cost Analysis Tables 
 
 
Table 14. 
Variable Cost Analysis 
Item Description QUsed Total Cost DWght RWght DCost RCost 
Dogs $5.88 per 30 ct. 30 $176.40 0.75 0.25 $133.09 $43.31 
Buns $1.82 per 16ct. 56 $101.92 0.75 0.25 $76.89 $25.03 
Chili $6.88 per 5lbs. 12 $82.56 1 0 $82.56 $0.00 
Cheese $13.27 per 5lbs. 3.5 $46.45 1 0 $46.45 $0.00 
Fritos $2.00 per bag 14 $25.76 1 0 $25.76 $0.00 
Relish $4.18 per Jug 1 $4.18 0.33 0.66 $1.39 $2.79 
Mustard $2.62 per Jug 1 $2.62 0.5 0.5 $1.31 $1.31 
Ketchup $3.68 per Jug 1 $3.68 0.5 0.5 $1.84 $1.84 
Onions $6.87 per Sack 0.6 $4.12 0.33 0.66 $1.37 $2.75 
          Sum $370.67 $77.02 
          Emp Dogs 100 12 
          Num Sold 576 208 
Total Variable Cost Per $0.55 $0.35 
56 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
56 Cost analysis presented in Table 14, Table15, and Table 16 was calculated from figures and receipts 
collected from May 31st to July 20th.   While prices of inputs (costs) did not change throughout the summer, 
the amounts shown and quantities used for calculation were not from the entire summer.  In no way should 
this make the analysis less accurate. 
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 Table 15. 
Fixed/Common Cost Analysis 
Napkins $16.37 per 4500 ct. 0.1 $1.64  
Wax Paper $5.24 per 1000 sheets 1 $5.24  
Hot Dog Tray $5.48 per 500 ct. 1 $5.48  
Propane $12.99 per 17lb 2.5 $32.48  
Gloves $5.16 per 500 1.5 $7.74  
Sum $52.58  
Cost Per $0.01  
  
Commercial Services account charges   $20.17  
Sales Taxes Differing Amounts   $19.94  
Hospitality Taxes % of Revenues   $18.10  
State Taxes % of Revenues   $57.00  
Gas Market Prices 12 gal. $38.00  
Hourly Pay 3/night @ $6/hour 33 $594.00  
Incentive Pay Varied   $227.50  
Sum $974.71  
Cost Per $1.09  
Total Common Cost Per $1.10  
 
 
Table 16. 
Average Total Cost Analysis for Both Products 
  Dank Regular 
Variable Cost Per:  $0.55  $0.35  
Common Cost Per:  $1.10  $1.10  
  
TOTAL COST PER: $1.65  $1.45  
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